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FOREWORD

The U.S. missions to Bosnia and Kosovo and the current
operation in Iraq make it clear that winning wars accomplishes little
if we cannot also win the peace. The strategic goals for which the
wars are fought can only be achieved if the follow-on mission leaves
an occupied territory more stable and democratic than before. Civilmilitary cooperation (CIMIC) is the key to achieving such stability.
Although such cooperation has occurred in the past, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization developed its own CIMIC doctrine
in response to the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s.
Humanitarian intervention requires the intervening military force to
provide security and lend its considerable assets to relief operations
and rebuilding.
CIMIC provides the mechanism for such cooperation and
support. Like any concept employed in coalition warfare, CIMIC
application varies widely. Examining diverse national approaches
to CIMIC in the ﬁeld reveals best practices and common mistakes.
Properly analyzed and learned, these lessons can inform the conduct
of current and future operations.
This study, by Dr. Thomas Mockaitis, is based on ﬁeld work in
Kosovo, supported by several years of research on peace operations.
Its principal value is as a historical record of where the U.S. military
was with regard to CIMIC in the 1990s. Much progress has been
made, though more remains to be done. The study concludes with
general recommendations for all militaries engaged in humanitarian
intervention and speciﬁc suggestions for improving the U.S.
approach to CIMIC.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The NATO deployment in Kosovo provides a unique
opportunity to study the effectiveness of civil-military cooperation
in humanitarian interventions and other stability and support
operations. Such a study can provide valuable insights into how
better to conduct a wide range of future missions. The importance
of this cooperation has already been demonstrated in Somalia and
Bosnia. The occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that it also
has an important role to play in the war on terrorism. Winning hearts
and minds through humanitarian assistance and development often
produces the intelligence necessary to ﬁnd terrorists.
A clear distinction must be made at the outset between the
NATO concept of “Civil-Military Cooperation” (CIMIC) and the
American term “Civil Affairs” (CA). While CIMIC refers speciﬁcally
to cooperation between NATO units on the one hand and civilian
institutions (including humanitarian organizations, the United
Nations, etc.) on the other, CA includes a broad range of activities, of
which civil-military cooperation is but one. The distinction between
the two concepts has more than academic signiﬁcance and helps
explain some of the difﬁculty the U.S. military has with humanitarian
interventions.
CIMIC now ﬁgures so prominently in NATO planning that all
Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations and prospective members are
scrambling to develop their own CIMIC doctrine. Given the lead role
the United States often plays in NATO missions, the U.S. military
must make sure that its own approach to CIMIC is as consistent as
possible with that of its allies. The best way to assure this consistency
is to compile a list of best practices and common mistakes discovered
by different national contingents in an actual mission and to then
work these lessons into CIMIC doctrine.
The current disinclination to assume the long-term task of
nation-building makes CIMIC even more important. The best way
to assure that humanitarian interventions remain of limited and
reasonable duration is to hand over control as soon as possible to
civil authorities and international, nongovernmental, and private
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volunteer organizations (IO, NGO, and PVO). CIMIC is the tool for
this transition. CIMIC also operates as a force multiplier, making it
possible for a signiﬁcantly smaller force to have the same or greater
effect than a larger one. The ability of CIMIC to make possible
shorter, smaller deployments should have great appeal to militaries
concerned about over-extension of their limited resources. Making
CIMIC more effective requires garnering lessons from past and
current missions.
Many characteristics of Kosovo and the international mission
there commend it as a case study. To begin with, the province is both
small and compact with a manageable population. This compactness
has meant that, despite widespread destruction of infrastructure
and homes, rebuilding has occurred rapidly. Unlike Bosnia, where
a brutal war lasted for 3 years, conﬂict in Kosovo remained brief
and the loss of life, though considerable, was not appalling. Such
conditions make the possibility of return of the minority Serbian
community possible. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) faced the possibility
of armed confrontation with the Yugoslav Army and the reality of
guerrilla action by the Kosovo Liberation Army. The ﬁrst possibility
quickly disappeared, and the second proved easily handled.
For its size, though, Kosovo has all the problems of humanitarian
intervention writ large upon it. A multiethnic state fractured
by apartheid and war, it dominated the headlines for 8 months.
Consequently, over 500 NGOs, IOs, and PVOs descended on the
province in the wake of the multinational KFOR. Coordinating
activities of all the players has been a major challenge. Properly
analyzed, the Kosovo mission may yield valuable lessons that will
inform the conduct of future operations at the policy, strategic,
operational, and tactical levels, all of which are more closely
interrelated than they might be in conventional war.
Analysis of the Kosovo intervention reveals certain valuable
lessons that may inform the conduct of future missions:
•

Military units and humanitarian organizations should
participate in joint pre-mission planning to ensure greater
cooperation in the ﬁeld.

•

Joint training and education can break down misunderstanding and mistrust so that CIMIC can be both a force
vi

multiplier for the military and an aid-delivery enhancer for
the humanitarian community.
•

Training and education can also help bridge the cultural
gap between the military’s formal vertical organization and
logistics-based approach to problem solving and the less
formal, horizontal organization and pragmatic approach to
problem solving of NGOs/IOs.

•

A military intervention force must be prepared to assume
police functions until a working civil police force can be
established. A power vacuum such as occurred during the
ﬁrst months of the Kosovo mission invites lawlessness and
revenge.

•

Tours of duty for troop contributors should be standardized
at no less than 6 months. Tours should overlap sufﬁciently to
allow the replacement unit to learn as much as possible about
the local situation. CIMIC units, or at least the ofﬁcers, should
have a longer hand-over period.

•

Military units should reevaluate rules for classifying
information. NGOs/IOs frequently complain that military
units ask them to share information but are unwilling to
share information with the humanitarians.

In addition to providing these general lessons, the Kosovo
intervention reveals speciﬁc challenges for the U.S. military:
•

U.S. troops need to base force-protection rules on the level
of threat in the ﬁeld. Over-reliance on body armor, visible
display of weaponry, and maintaining distance from the
civilian population interfere with the mission and, under
some circumstances, may even put soldiers at greater risk.
Ofﬁcers and enlisted personnel engaged in CIMIC should
be allowed greater latitude in determining appropriate force
protection.

•

The U.S. military should adopt NATO terminology,
deﬁnitions, and doctrine on CIMIC and clearly distinguish
between CA and CIMIC.
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•

CIMIC units (usually Reserve Civil Affairs battalions) should
be more closely integrated into the operational mission so that
they may have access to the resources of the entire force. The
force commander should have greater latitude in employing
civilian contractors assigned to U.S. missions.

•

Humanitarian intervention requires decentralization of
command and control so that CIMIC personnel are free to
act on their own initiative within broad mission guidelines.
Currently American personnel are over-constrained by the
need to ask up the chain of command for permission to act on
even relatively routine matters.

•

American soldiers need to be better educated about the
history and culture of lands in which they deploy. Training
should focus on more effective ways of interacting with local
people, which take into account culturally determined rules
of hospitality, conﬂict resolution, etc.

Conclusion: CIMIC will be vital to the success of U.S. missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in future missions.
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CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS:
THE CASE OF KOSOVO
INTRODUCTION
While civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is arguably as old as
warfare itself, CIMIC as a formal doctrine dates to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) operations of the 1990s.1 Faced with
a series of complex humanitarian emergencies in Croatia, Bosnia,
and Kosovo, the Alliance recognized the need to develop regular
procedures to facilitate cooperation between its military units and
the relief organizations with which they needed to work. NATO
deﬁnes CIMIC as:
The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the
NATO commander and civil actors, including national population and
local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental
organizations and agencies.2

CIMIC includes three core tasks: liaison between the military
contingent and all the civilian actors in the area of operation,
“support to the civilian environment,” and “support to the force.”3
“Support to the civilian environment” includes tasks that the
U.S. military would consider “Civil Affairs (CA) activities:”
1. enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities
in areas where military forces are present; and
2. involve the application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas
normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of
CMO (Civil Military Operations).4

CMO, in turn, are “the activities of a commander that establish,
maintain, inﬂuence, or exploit relations between military forces,
governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and
authorities and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or
hostile operational area.”5
While the American concepts of CA and CMO include tasks
common to CIMIC and the U.S. accepts in principle NATO doctrine,
1

the distinction between the two is more than semantic. In practice,
U.S. forces appear to place less emphasis on CA activities than
some of their NATO allies. CA/CMO also relegates the liaison
and cooperative functions of CIMIC to secondary roles. As will
be seen, this approach creates problems for the U.S. military in a
humanitarian intervention, such as Kosovo, beyond those faced by
other NATO nations.
While CIMIC has a role to play in a wide range of military
missions, humanitarian intervention presents such unique challenges
that it deserves to be considered a unique phenomenon. Lessons
learned from this, the most challenging type of CIMIC operation,
will, of course, be applicable to other activities. Humanitarian
interventions of the type seen in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo require
the intervention of a military force to end ﬁghting, establish and
preserve order, facilitate relief operations, and aid in the rebuilding
of infrastructure and civil institutions. The environment in which
such operations occur, most commonly a failed state, determines
the actors with whom the military force must work. By deﬁnition, a
failed state, or in the case of Kosovo a province from which the once
legitimate authority has withdrawn, has few, if any, functioning
civil institutions. The primary players will be the intervention force
and relief organizations. The latter consist of International, Nongovernmental, and Private Volunteer Organizations (IO, NGO,
PVO). CIMIC provides a mechanism for bridging the gap between
the intervention force on the one hand, and the relief organizations
and civil institutions (as they emerge or are rebuilt) on the other.
When successful at this task, CIMIC operates as a force multiplier,
making it possible for a signiﬁcantly smaller deployment to have the
same or greater effect than a larger one. Effective CIMIC may also
shorten deployments and mitigate what critics deride as long-term
and costly “nation-building” operations.
As with any strategic concept, the best way to make CIMIC
more effective is to garner lessons from speciﬁc operations. Many
characteristics of the Kosovo intervention commend it as a case
study. To begin with, the province is both small and compact, with
a manageable population. This compactness has meant that, despite
widespread destruction of infrastructure and homes, rebuilding
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has occurred rapidly. Unlike Bosnia, where a brutal war lasted
for 3 years, conﬂict in Kosovo remained brief, and the loss of life,
though considerable, was not appalling. Such conditions have made
the challenges of post-conﬂict peace-building more manageable.
For its size, though, Kosovo has all the problems of humanitarian
intervention writ large upon it. A multiethnic state fractured
by apartheid and war, it dominated the headlines for 8 months.
Consequently, over 500 NGOs, IOs, and PVOs descended on the
province in the wake of the multinational Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Coordinating activities of all the players has been a major challenge.
Properly analyzed, the Kosovo mission may yield valuable lessons
that will inform the conduct of future operations at the policy,
strategic, operational, and tactical levels, all of which are more
closely inter-related than they might be in conventional war.6
KOSOVO IN CONTEXT
Geography.
Kosovo (Albanian, Kosova) became the southern-most province
of Serbia following the 1913 Balkan War. With an area of only 4,126
square miles (about half the size of New Jersey), Kosovo lies at the
crossroads of the central Balkans and, for this reason alone, has
long been of strategic importance. It borders the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia on the south, Albania on the southwest,
Montenegro on the northwest, and Serbia proper on the north and
west. (See Figure 1.) The land consists of a large central plain divided
by low hills running north to south through its center and ringed
with mountains. These are highest along the Montenegrin and
western Macedonian borders. Those along the Albanian border are
considerably lower, and most of the Serbian border passes through
low hills. To the east Kosovo opens into the Prestvo Valley of Serbia
proper.
Besides its rich soil, Kosovo has deposits of lead, zinc, lignite,
chrome, magnetite, and nickel. The lead and zinc mine at Trepca
and the magnetite mine south of Pristina are particularly valuable.7
Despite its mineral wealth, Kosovo was the poorest region of the
former Yugoslavia.
3

Figure 1.
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Demographics.
Despite Serbia’s sporadic efforts to colonize Kosovo with ethnic
Serbians, Albanians have been the majority at least since the second
half of the 20th century. Poverty and ethnic strife encouraged many
Serbians to immigrate to Serbia proper or abroad. According to the
last census taken before the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991),
Albanians comprised almost 82 percent of the population, Serbians
just under 10 percent, and Roma (Gypsies), Muslim Slavs, and others
the remaining 8 percent.8 Despite their minority status, Serbians
were concentrated heavily in certain areas of prewar Kosovo. They
comprised the majority in the northern Mitrovica region and could
be found in large concentrations around the provincial capital,
Pristina, in the Gjilan/Gnjilane region to the east, and around the
town of Stripca in the south. These concentrations would have
profound implications for the Kosovo mission, particularly in north
Mitrovica.
Ethnicity, language, and religion distinguish Serbians from
Albanians. Most Albanians learned Serbo-Croatian of necessity,
but fewer Serbians could speak Albanian. While the majority of
Albanians are Muslim, most wear their religion lightly, a fact that
surprised and perhaps shocked some Middle Eastern NGOs. A
minority of Albanians practice Roman Catholicism, although this
distinction has had no impact on the conﬂict. Virtually the entire
Serbian population of Kosovo was at least nominally Serbian
Orthodox Christian, although practice varied widely. Yugoslavia
had been, after all, a Communist country and therefore secular for
50 years. Serbian nationalists have, however, made much of historic
monasteries and churches as justiﬁcation for Serbian control of the
province. Not surprisingly, KFOR troops have had to guard these
sites. Religious difference in Kosovo, as in most conﬂict areas, may
best be understood as a cultural marker visibly distinguishing one
group from another rather than as ancient religious hatred. When
other grievances are addressed, religious tension tends to decline.
History.
The real history of the province had little impact on the events
that led to NATO intervention. Serbians and Albanians both forged
5

a national mythology out of sketchy historical detail embellished
by folklore and literary imagination. The violent political struggle
between Serbians and Albanians has been mirrored by “competing
historical perceptions, myths, fears, and vendettas.”9 Cynical
politicians like Slobodan Milosevic stirred ethnic hatred fueled by
the economic dislocations at the end of the Cold War. The Yugoslav
president revoked provincial autonomy in 1989 and systematically
repressed the Albanian majority for the next decade.
Faced with overwhelming Serbian military power and isolated
from outside help, the Albanians had little recourse but the
Ghandian strategy of nonviolent resistance. Led by Ibrahim Rugova,
Albanian Kosovars created a parallel state within Kosovo. In
addition to underground political institutions, this “state” provided
the rudiments of education, health care, and even sports.10
This situation changed dramatically in 1997. Following a ﬁnancial
crisis, the government of neighboring Albania collapsed and in the
process lost control of its military arsenals. Guns poured onto the
black market and into the hands of Kosovo’s ﬂedgling revolutionary
movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK from its
Albanian initials). This small organization formed in 1993 now had
the means to conduct an armed struggle and lost no time in doing
so.
Adopting a classic insurgency strategy, the KLA assassinated
Serbian policemen, Serbian ofﬁcials, and Albanian collaborators
in the fall of 1997.11 These actions provoked what Rugova had
long feared, Serbian military aggression against the Albanian
population as a whole.12 Beginning in February 1998, Serbian police
and paramilitaries backed by the Yugoslav Army (VJ) launched a
campaign in the Drenica region east of Pristina, a hotbed of KLA
activity, killing 51 people, including rebel leader Adam Jashari and
20 members of his family. The dead included 11 children and 23
women. Another 85 people were murdered in the ensuing week.13
As many as 250,000 Albanians ﬂed the region.14 The crackdown
transformed the KLA from a radical fringe group into a popular
movement.15
In addition to provoking Serbian reprisals that would win them
popular support, the KLA also hoped to draw international attention
to their cause. They did not have long to wait. Fresh from the bitter
6

experience of Bosnia and facing the prospect of yet another round of
ethnic cleansing, the Clinton administration goaded its NATO allies
into a reluctant air war against Serbia. Milosevic capitulated 78 days
later and withdrew from Kosovo.
A HYBRID MISSION
The humanitarian intervention in Kosovo consisted of three
distinct elements, each with numerous components: KFOR, the
NATO military mission, which consisted of contingents from
member states, plus “Partnership for Peace (PfP)” countries.
Developed in the aftermath of the Cold War, PfP served the dual
purpose of allowing former Warsaw Pact nations to participate in
the alliance, while placating Russian fears of NATO expansion. PfP
allowed contingents from the Russian Federation and Ukraine to
take part in the two Bosnia missions (Implementation Force and
Stabilization Force) and now the Kosovo intervention. In addition
to authorizing KFOR, the UN deployed its own autonomous civilian
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Finally, a host of humanitarian
organizations nominally guided by the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees entered the province in the wake of KFOR.
Only in the loosest sense of the term could this polyglot collection
of players be deemed a “mission.” KFOR units had diverse experience
in peace operations, interpreted their duties differently, and enjoyed
considerable autonomy. NGOs, IOs, and PVOs ranged from the
highly competent to the grossly inept and answered only to their
sponsors. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had
no authority to compel their cooperation. Charged with rebuilding
and/or creating civil institutions ranging from the police to a
working government, UNMIK oversaw activities by the European
Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). Although the intervention restored order, saved
lives, and muddled through, poor coordination, overlapping
jurisdiction, and gaps in authority created serious problems. CIMIC
functioned best in battalion and brigade areas of responsibility and
only gradually developed into a coordinated, province-wide effort.
The most important cooperation at the outset occurred between the
military and humanitarian organizations.
7

The Five Kingdoms.
The KFOR mission plan divided Kosovo into ﬁve multinational
brigade (MNB) areas, each under command of a lead nation.16 (See
Figure 2.) This division of responsibility proved a great strength and
a glaring weakness of the mission. As one CIMIC ofﬁcer observed,
there is no single Kosovo but many Kosovos. KFOR’s decentralized
command structure accorded well with the equally decentralized
nature of the province and provided local commanders ample
latitude for dealing with uniquely local problems or with provincial
problems with uniquely local manifestations. On the other hand, the
NATO mission suffered from a lack of cohesiveness and consistency
that has driven more than one NGO around the bend. Any
assessment of CIMIC’s best practices and most serious mistakes
must focus at the brigade level, taking into account the situation
peculiar to each area of operation and the speciﬁc military cultures
of the units operating within it.17

KFOR
KFOR DEPLOYMENT
DEPLOYMENT

MNB NORTH
Hungary, Greece, Denmark
UAE, Russia, Belgium

Turkey, Bulgaria, Finland,
Portugal, Spain

MNB WEST

MNB CENTRE
Finland, Sweeden, Belgium,
Ireland, Russia, Czech Rep.,
Norway, Canada,
Hungary

Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Netherlands,
Russia, Austria,
Turkey

Russia,
Greece,
Poland

MNB EAST

MNB SOUTH

Source: OSCE

Figure 2.
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Multinational Brigade Area North, The French.
MNB area North ran from the provincial border of Serbia
proper, southwest along the boundary with the Sanjak, and then
southeast towards Pristina, taking in the municipalities of Mitrovica,
Leposavic, Vucitrn, Srbica, and Zubin Potok. It included the northern
part of Drenica and the valuable Trepca mines. Mitrovica city and
the region to its north contained the largest concentration of Serbians
before the war and remains the only area of Kosovo that has not
witnessed a massive Serbian exodus. This concentration of Serbians
and the bitterness felt by Drenica Albanians have made MNB North
the most difﬁcult area of operation within Kosovo.
The MNB North contingent numbered 9,208 at the height of
KFOR troop strength in October 1999.18 Built around a French
brigade, the contingent has included units from Belgium, Denmark,
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hungary, and Russia, under
over-all French command. MNB North’s CIMIC unit consists of
about 60 ofﬁcers and enlisted personnel drawn from French and
other national units. Most are reservists serving a 4-month rotation,
with the commanding ofﬁcer, a French Colonel, serving a 6-month
rotation. The French draw some of their ofﬁcers from branches of
the regular army. The CIMIC unit has had a limited humanitarian
budget but good relations with NGOs in France and the other troopcontributing countries.
The French have been criticized severely by the NGO/IO
community and other national units, particularly for their handling
of Mitrovica City, which they occupy. When they moved into the
town, French units allowed Serbians from south of the river to ﬂee
to the northern part of city and then watched as angry Albanians
burned the Roma quarter. They made no effort to stop Serbian
paramilitaries from blocking the return of Albanians to their homes
in north Mitrovica. A group of 100 “bridge watchers” continue to
guard the river crossings, and the brigade refuses to turf them out.
However, critics of the French seriously over-simplify the
situation in Mitrovica City. The Ibar River does not, as most sources
claim, neatly divide the city into a northern Serbian and a southern
Albanian half. Serbian and Albanian apartment buildings alternate
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along the north bank of the river. Furthermore, north Mitrovica
contains perhaps the only multiethnic neighborhood in the entire
region. In addition, Serbian paramilitaries have dug in along the
heights north of the river. The French maintain that any effort to
forcibly return Albanian refugees or to remove the bridge watchers
would unleash a wave of ethnic violence that would take many
lives and be hard to contain. Albanians north of the river might
well be driven out, and the multiethnic neighborhood would almost
certainly be torn apart.
Under these difﬁcult conditions the effectiveness of CIMIC in
Mitrovica City has been limited. Brigade CIMIC teams built a bakery
in the multiethnic neighborhood. They have also provided escorts
to Serbian leaders traveling south for conﬁdence building meetings
with their Albanian counterparts. These measures notwithstanding,
there are serious problems with CIMIC operations in the city.
Relations between the brigade and UNMIK police have been poor.
In April 2002, a police unit trying to arrest wanted Serbians in north
Mitrovica came under attack and found itself without military
backup. Brigade headquarters maintained that, since no one had
informed them of the police action, they could hardly be expected
to provide support. Such a serious breakdown of communication is
itself problematic. NGOs frequently asserted that the French were
the worst military unit with which to deal. They maintain that the
French have often refused to provide escorts into north Mitrovica
City and have not facilitated return of refugees (Serbian, Albanian,
and Roma) to their homes in order to achieve the stated UN goal of
a multiethnic Kosovo.
However one assesses operations in Mitrovica City, it would be
a mistake to judge MNB North CIMIC entirely on operation in this
one locale. Projects in the Drenica region represent some of the most
effective CIMIC that has been done in Kosovo. The brigade enjoys
good relations with many different NGOs, and its CIMIC teams
cooperate with them on many projects. In one village, the French
Red Cross built a school, and the brigade then added a playground.
Brigade engineers have piped running water for entire villages.
They have also repaired roads and built bridges.
Several factors contribute to the effectiveness of these CIMIC
projects. Foremost, brigade headquarters has interpreted its security
10

mission broadly and clearly understands that CIMIC contributes
profoundly to that mission. As one brigade commander noted,
no one likes having his house searched, no matter how polite the
soldiers are, but if the home owner sees that those same soldiers also
provide running water for his village, he may be more cooperative.
The brigade commander’s strong support has made the task of
the CIMIC unit much easier. MNB North has made its resources
available for CIMIC projects throughout the area of operations.
A team needing a bulldozer to level a playing ﬁeld for a school
in a hamlet near Skenderaj was not told that such work is not a
“security” or “freedom of movement” mission and, therefore, not
the brigade’s proper job―an answer American teams have certainly
encountered. They got the bulldozer, non-CIMIC personnel to run it,
and the services of French or Belgian engineers as needed. Since this
project and others like it was done in cooperation with humanitarian
organizations, it was truly CIMIC and not merely CA.
Reasonable force protection rules have complimented MNB
North’s ﬂexible approach to CIMIC. Individual units have discretion
in determining security measures appropriate to each task and
situation. Patrols in north Mitrovica City might wear ﬂak jackets
and helmets and carry automatic riﬂes, but CIMIC teams in Drenica
will probably leave helmets and jackets in their jeeps. Realizing
that heavy weapons put a barrier between the team and the people
it is trying to help, the team will be satisﬁed with side arms for
personal protection. The absence of any serious incident stemming
from relaxed force protection and the cordial relations MNB North
personnel enjoy with the Albanian and Serbian communities attests
to the efﬁcacy of this approach.
Flexible rules of force protection are but one manifestation of
the decentralization characteristic of European armies and so vital
to CIMIC. MNB North CIMIC teams operate from a general mission
plan but are left to implement it without the top-down style of
management characteristic of the American military and, indeed, of
American corporate culture in general. This approach encourages
junior ofﬁcers and NCOs to develop projects that ﬁt the needs of a
particular area. For example, the brigade set up a food and clothing
distribution center in Skenderaj. Run by a reserve ofﬁcer, an NCO,
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and local interpreters, the center provided essentials to local people
in need. Most of the clothing came from charities in the brigade
nations’ home countries. The food, however, was collected from the
brigade itself. Acting on her own initiative but with active support
and encouragement, a young French corporal collected unused
portions of ﬁeld rations and other tinned and packaged items that
might otherwise have been wasted.
Finally, cultural similarities between MNB North troop
contributors and the Kosovo communities they serve make
communication easier. Anthropologists describe these cultures as
“high context.” Within such cultures, relationship building must
precede any business transaction. A CIMIC team wanting to discuss
a project must ﬁrst socialize with local leaders over coffee and
cigarettes. Conversation covers the well-being of individuals and
their families, the general state of the village, and, rather belatedly,
the matter at hand. Relationship building takes up perhaps threefourths of the visit. Accepting hospitality is vital to the success of
CIMIC in most situations.
Although MNB North CIMIC must be seen as generally
successful, Mitrovica City notwithstanding, problems have occurred.
French units deploy for 4 months, among the shortest tours in KFOR.
Such short-term deployment is the bane of NGO workers’ existence.
No sooner do they explain their work and the local situation to one
CIMIC ofﬁcer than another takes his place, and they have to start
all over again. Critics also wonder whether the hands-on approach
of MNB North fosters dependency that will prove problematic
once KFOR leaves. Local people do, in fact, look to the brigade to
help them even before they turn to UNMIK or their own emerging
civil institutions, rightly perceiving that the military has far greater
resources and is generally willing to use them. To borrow a wellworn cliché, the French and their allies are accused of handing out
ﬁsh without teaching people to ﬁsh for themselves. It might be said
in response that people must ﬁrst be given ﬁshing poles before they
can learn to ﬁsh. Until self-government becomes a working reality,
outside actors, military or civilian, have little choice but to do what
needs to done.
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Multinational Brigade East, The Americans.
MNB East borders Serbia proper on the east and north and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the South. It includes
the municipalities of Stripce, Kacanik, Gjilan, Urosevac, Vitina,
Novo Brdo, and Kamenica. One of the most ethnically diverse areas
of Kosovo before the war, the brigade area suffered less damage
than other areas of Kosovo. These factors have made repatriation of
minority Serbians somewhat easier than elsewhere in the province.
The United States, in fact, chose this area, believing that it would
be one of the quieter ones. The spread of ethnic violence across the
provincial boundary to the Presvo valley in Serbia proper and later
to Macedonia, however, complicated the mission.
The MNB East contingent numbered 8,453 at the height of KFOR
troop strength in October 1999.19 Built around a U.S. task force, the
contingent has included units from Russia, Greece, and Poland,
under over-all U.S. command. MNB East CIMIC occurs at the
national contingent level with relatively little interaction between
units. Reserve CA companies of about 55 ofﬁcers and enlisted
personnel, augmented by regular ofﬁcers, perform the CIMIC duties
of the U.S. military, although the army has not adopted the NATO
terminology.
The U.S. military has moved beyond the abhorrence of
unconventional war that developed in the aftermath of Vietnam.
Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) occupy a respected
place in joint doctrine and indeed comprised the bulk of U.S. missions
in the 1990s. Institutional attitudes and culture, however, change
slowly. The conventional war mentality affects the approach even
to unconventional tasks. Until the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq
necessitated change, the Pentagon resisted siphoning off forces for
protracted stability and support operations. The political aversion to
casualties and the Bush administration’s stated opposition to nationbuilding before 9/11 encouraged this mentality. Operating under
such constraints, both perceived and stated, commanders in the ﬁeld
understandably played it safe. They generally kept the Civil Affairs
units on a relatively short leash and the rest of the force removed
from CIMIC activities.
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U.S. KFOR interpreted UN Resolution 1244 as narrowly as
possible. They understood the tasks of “security” and “freedom of
movement” in traditional military terms. During the summer of 1999,
they assigned Greek KFOR troops to protect a handful of elderly
Serbians in Urosevic. They have also provided escorts for returning
Serbians, cleared land mines, and disarmed the KLA. Additionally,
they acted to remove any impediments to freedom of movement
within their area of operation. They did not, however, understand
CIMIC as vital to security; they considered the task of rebuilding
infrastructure and institutions to be almost the exclusive task of the
NGO/IO community, with the CA unit providing minimal support
largely in the form of expertise. By spring 2002 they had lost access
to funds for direct assistance.
Nothing underscores American discomfort with peace operations
more than the emphasis on force protection at the expense even of
mission success. The bitter experience of Vietnam underscored by
the tragedy of Somalia taught the U.S. military to keep local people
at a distance. They wished to prevent anyone neutralizing American
ﬁrepower with “hugging tactics” such as those used by the Vietcong.20
They also wished to avoid urban terrain, which could have the same
neutralizing effect, as occurred in Mogadishu. The main U.S. base in
Kosovo reﬂects these concerns. Unlike other brigade headquarters
located in major towns, Camp Bondsteel stands in open country, a
huge ﬁre support base capable of withstanding a siege. Bondsteel is,
furthermore, a self-contained American city complete with all the
amenities of home. Soldiers can buy a whopper, fries, and coke at
Burger King or shop at the Base Exchange using American dollars.
They need never leave base, and in fact, garrisoning Bondsteel
requires an inordinately large percentage of the task force―a fact
that those who complain about the overextension of U.S. forces
should pause to consider.
Stringent force protection rules complement Bondsteel’s
emphasis on physical security. Within this virtually impregnable
fortress, soldiers walk around armed even as they stand in line at
Burger King. Outside the base, they travel in hardtop Humvees and
wear their “battle-rattle” (Kevlar helmet and Flak jacket or body
armor) wherever they go. During the early days of the mission, such
precautions made sense, but they look increasingly out of place as
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Kosovo moves towards normalcy. The United States does not adjust
force protection to ﬁt the needs of an evolving mission or a particular
situation, nor does it allow individual units the discretion to adjust
precautions to ﬁt particular tasks.21 The soldiers themselves are
among the strongest critics of these stringent guidelines. A CIMIC
ofﬁcer from another national unit astutely observed that such force
protection substitutes “blame management” for risk management.
Other foreign observers comment that the Americans seemed to
regard force protection as the mission itself, rather than as a means
to accomplishing it.
Over-emphasis on force protection wastes human resources
because a disproportionate number of troops must be detailed
to protect the rest. This emphasis may also interfere with CIMIC
operations. Ofﬁcials from UNHCR and Doctors without Borders
commented that robust displays of force often intimidated already
frightened people. For example, one UNHCR protection ofﬁcer
complained that heavy escorts for “look-see” visits by potential
Serbian returnees created an expectation of trouble. They also left
the Serbians wondering how they could possibly live safely in a
place that they visit only under heavily armed escort. Reluctantly
and belatedly (by the summer of 2002), MNB East had begun to scale
back protection to more reasonable levels.
This cautious approach adversely affects civil-military
cooperation. Unlike their French, British, or Italian counterparts, U.S.
CA teams cannot adjust force protection to ﬁt situations and tasks.
As one ofﬁcer observed, being dressed like a Ninja Turtle gets in the
way. Force protection can inhibit the relationship building essential
to doing work in the Balkans. American GIs are discouraged from
socializing with the locals and are expressly forbidden by regulations
from having a drink with them. The inability to give, and especially
to receive, hospitality puts distance between the CA personnel and
those with whom they are trying to work. Ironically, Special Forces
liaison teams enjoy both ﬂexibility and discretion in the conduct of
their duties. Since regular CA battalions in the U.S. force structure
fall under special operations command, one could expect that the
same latitude would be granted to them, but this is not the case. If
anything, CA units in Kosovo have been kept on an even shorter
leash because they have been reservists.
15

U.S. CIMIC further suffers from the narrow deﬁnition of its tasks.
CA units initially had some humanitarian aid funds, but these were
cut as the mission evolved. Teams may lend their considerable skills
and expertise but have virtually no material resources with which
to conduct projects. Nor can they draw on the extensive resources
of the brigade. A single episode in Gjilan illustrates the challenge
of operating under such constraints. Since potable water must be
made available to rebuilt villages, an American CA team needed
to get wells dug. They had the trained personnel but lacked the
funds for such a project, nor could they use equipment belonging
to engineer units since digging wells was not properly “security” or
“freedom of movement.” Ofﬁcers from the most powerful nation in
the world had to ﬁnd an NGO willing to foot the bill for the project,
while the needed equipment sat idle at Bondsteel. Lending expertise
without material resources has been defended on two grounds:
(1) rebuilding is properly the task of NGOs, IOs, and emerging civil
institutions; and, (2) “it is better to teach people to ﬁsh and feed them
for a lifetime than to give them a ﬁsh and feed them for a day.” This
logic has two corresponding ﬂaws: (1) post-conﬂict peacebuilding
is the job of all players, military and civilian, and (2) there is no
point teaching people to ﬁsh if they do not have ﬁshing poles. The
Kosovars do not have well-digging equipment.22
The limitations under which U.S. CA teams operate make their
accomplishments all the more impressive. They have earned high
marks from most of the organizations with which they work for the
“can do” attitude they take to problem solving. The civilian skills
they bring as reservists have proven invaluable to rebuilding critical
infrastructure. A civilian police ofﬁcer convinced the Urosevic police
chief to reassign ofﬁcers to assist the forester in preventing illegal
woodcutting. His team also worked with local schools to provide
English language books, particularly on the subjects of history and
civics, thus teaching language skills and democracy. A civil engineer
taught members of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) how to assess
structural damage following an earthquake in April 2002. U.S. KFOR
also set up weekly shopping trips to Gjilan for Serbians from Stripce.
Initially UNHCR considered the trips too risky, but they have since
given the Americans high praise for the initiative. U.S. Medical
ofﬁcers help the local hospital with needed supplies.
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In addition to problems created by force protection and narrow
task deﬁnitions, the American approach to civil-military cooperation
faces further difﬁculties. In contrast to most of its European KFOR
allies, the United States has a “low-context culture.”23 Americans
prefer to “cut the small talk” and “get to the point.” They believe
“time is money” and have little patience for relationship building.
Such an approach may work well enough in the American business
world, but it is not effective in the Balkans. While NGOs and IOs
appreciate the American desire to solve problems, the line between
“can do” and “bull in a China shop” is small indeed. On one occasion
an NGO was engaged in delicate negotiations to resolve a conﬂict
between two factions over what color to paint a youth center near
Gjilan. Growing frustrated with what he perceived as needless delay
over a trivial matter, an American ofﬁcer forced a solution after a
heated exchange with the parties. He then left, satisﬁed with having
solved the problem, leaving the NGO to spend the next month
sorting out the mess. The color scheme was nothing but the tip of a
very large iceberg.
Like the French, the United States relies on short-term
deployment, albeit for 6 rather than 4 months. Consequently, NGOs
waste time reexplaining the local situation to every new unit. One
aid worker recounted how a CA ofﬁcer showed up at her door,
insisting that more Serbian doctors be brought to Gjilan hospital so
that Serbians would feel more comfortable being treated there. She
politely informed him that such a program already existed, and that
Serbian doctors had been attending patients at the hospital for some
time.
On balance, the success of the U.S. approach to civil-military
cooperation has been mixed. CA units have accomplished a great
deal, thanks primarily to the dedication of their personnel. Given the
U.S. resources of Task Force Falcon, however, these accomplishments
seem far less than they might be. The weakness of the U.S. approach
lies primarily at the strategic and operational levels, rather than at
the tactical level. CIMIC smacks too much of the long-term, openended commitment, with no clear exit strategy that U.S. commanders
abhor. Although more willing than their predecessors to take on
nation-building tasks, they still prefer to provide the muscle for
intervention (as they did in the Kosovo air war) and then turn over
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peacekeeping duties to America’s allies. NATO politics, however,
require shared risk, so the United States deploys at least some forces
to most operations. The U.S. military thus ends up doing reluctantly
what it does not really wish to do at all. Believing that the best way
to keep the deployment short, they keep CA units on a short leash
and at arm’s length. Ironically, this approach ends up producing
exactly the opposite result. The best way to avoid protracted nationbuilding is to do CIMIC well.
Multinational Brigade Area South, The Germans.
MNB Area South centers on the ancient city of Prizren. It
stretches north to include the municipalities of Suva Reka and
Orahovac, southeast to the Macedonian border, and southwest to
the Albanian border. Before the war, MNB South, like MNB North,
was not particularly integrated. Serbians formed the majority in and
around Strpce, where many have remained in one of Kosovo’s larger
minority enclaves. The southernmost Gora region had the province’s
largest concentration of Slav Moslems. With the exception of Roma
pockets, Albanians constituted the majority in the rest of the brigade
area.
MNB South had been the scene of extensive violence during
and after the war. Serbian police and paramilitaries backed by the
Yugoslav army ethnically cleansed villages and destroyed many
homes. Retaliation and looting following the Serbian withdrawal
caused further destruction. By October 1999, 97 percent of Serbians
and 60 percent of gypsies had left Prizren itself. Fewer than 4,000
Serbians remain in the area.24 MNB South consists of a German
brigade augmented by Austrian, Turkish, Danish, Finnish, Dutch,
Norwegian, and Russian units.25
The MNB South contingent numbered 8,053 at the height
of KFOR troop strength in October 1999.26 The brigade has the
largest CIMIC unit in KFOR, with over 100 personnel. Despite
this considerable capacity, it takes a conservative approach to
CIMIC, not unlike that of the Americans. This similarity mirrors the
resemblance of the two militaries. Germany rebuilt its army on the
American model in the 1950s as a strictly NATO force. To preclude
its ever acting independently, the Bundeswehr did not have its own
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general staff, relying on the alliance staff instead. Germany also
shares the U.S. aversion to casualties and, because of its Nazi past,
is even more reluctant to deploy its forces overseas. Indeed, the ﬁrst
discussions over German participation in peace operations sparked
a constitutional debate as to whether such deployment was even
legal.
Given these similarities, it should come as no surprise that the
Germans have copied the U.S. approach to CIMIC. They have,
arguably, proven to be even more conservative than their American
mentors. German KFOR places the same emphasis on excessive
force protection. Its soldiers carry automatic weapons into mess
halls, where other contingents eat unarmed in shirtsleeves. Signs
on German bases and guarded facilities proclaim in Serbian and
Albanian a free ﬁre zone. Soldiers manning checkpoints wear
the same “battle-rattle” as their American counterparts. This
preoccupation with force protection quite naturally produces a
play-it-safe attitude toward CIMIC. At the beginning of the mission,
MNB South conducted foot and vehicle patrols, disarmed the KLA,
protected deliveries of humanitarian aid, and safe-guarded minority
enclaves.27 Once the Albanian refugees and IDPs had returned and
the brigade restored a modicum of stability, the Germans became
staunch defenders of the status quo. They asked NGOs wishing to
facilitate Serbian returns to guarantee that such returns would not
provoke conﬂict. No one could, of course, provide such a guarantee,
so the German’s objected to return operations. They saw no point
in taking any action that threatened to destabilize the situation.
Defending the status quo may be easy in the short run, but it delays
the building of a lasting peace and may actually increase the amount
of time the peace force needs to remain in place. By April 2002, even
UNHCR found it necessary to prod the Germans into action.
The resettlement of Albanians was, of course, another matter.
The German brigade has been quite aggressive in rebuilding
homes for Albanian Kosovars, even lending the brigade’s military
resources to the project. They may, however, have been motivated
more by domestic political considerations within Germany than by
concern for refugees. With one of the world’s most generous asylum
policies, Germany has allowed a large number of Albanian refugees
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to enter the country. With the war over, they would prefer that these
refugees return home.
Within MNB South, other nations have been more willing to
help and to some degree are more effective. The Austrian contingent
at Suva Reka demonstrates what even a small CIMIC team can
accomplish with limited resources but dedicated personnel and
support from the rest of the national contingent. Austrian CIMIC
consists of an under-strength platoon attached to a single battalion.
Because they have no humanitarian aid or development budget, the
Austrians have become very proﬁcient at locating NGOs willing to
fund a project and then lending their military assets to it. In what
may be a unique innovation, they have charged an individual in
the Austrian Ministry of Defense with lining up donors for CIMIC
projects in Kosovo. For example, Austrian KFOR worked closely
with the German NGO Kinderberg to build a youth center in Suva
Reka. In cooperation with an Austrian sports league, they also built
a sports facility in the city. They also facilitated the visit of a team
of planners from the Technical University of Vienna and provided
monthly monitoring of a local health clinic built by the Red Cross.28
The success of Austrian CIMIC depends heavily on the
willingness of the battalion to contribute its resources to projects.
A single example illustrates this point. Wells in the Suva Reka area
had become contaminated during the war and needed to be cleaned.
Since the battalion sanitation ofﬁcer had little to do in the Austrian
camp, she lent her technical expertise to the operation. The Austrians
also provided the cleaning equipment and instructed the Kosovars
in how to use it. The locals thus did the work that would not have
otherwise been done. In other words, the Austrians ﬁrst lent them
“ﬁshing poles” and then “taught them how to ﬁsh.” This approach
contrasts markedly with the American experience in Gjilan, where
CIMIC teams received virtually no assistance from U.S. KFOR in
getting wells dug.
Not surprisingly, the Austrians have a relaxed attitude towards
force protection. Signiﬁcantly, their CIMIC center stands next to the
entrance of the battalion camp with the letters “CIMIC” spelled out
in white stones clearly visible from the road. Outside the camp, they
adjust armament and protective equipment to the situation. Force
protection does not impede the conduct of CIMIC operations.
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Multinational Brigade West, The Italians.
MNB West centers on the city of Pec, bordering Montenegro
on the west and northwest, the Sanjak on the north, and Albania
on the south and southwest. Internally, the brigade area abuts the
MNB North, MNB South, and at one point (the town of Glogovac)
MNB Center. The area suffered in rapid succession the depravity of
ethnic cleansing, damage from NATO bombing, and retaliation by
the KLA (UCK) and returning Albanian refugees. By the end of the
conﬂict, the region had one of the highest concentrations of category
ﬁve housing (totally destroyed), 80 percent in some areas.29 Most of
the Albanian refugees had returned, while most of the minorities
(Serbian, Muslim Slav, and Roma) had ﬂed. KLA anger focused on
Serbians and Roma, whom they accused of collaboration with the
Serbians.30
The MNB North contingent numbered 5,222 at the height of
KFOR troop strength in October 1999.31 Built around an Italian
brigade, the contingent has included units from Spain, Portugal,
Argentina, Bulgaria, and Turkey, under over-all French command.
MNB West CIMIC consists of approximately 60 ofﬁcers and enlisted
personnel. From its formation until November 2002, when KFOR
combined the brigade area with MNB South, the Italians were the
lead nation ably supported by the Spaniards. Because of their longstanding involvement with Albania proper, the Italians understood
the local culture and enjoyed good relations with the Kosovar
Albanians. The Italians also got on particularly well with Orthodox
monks at the monasteries in Decane and Pec, often bringing them
food as well as providing escorts.32
Initially the troops of MNB West had their hands full trying to
keep order and assisting in the massive humanitarian relief effort.
As occurred elsewhere in Kosovo, KFOR proved unable to protect
all Serbians, Roma, and Muslim Slavs from retaliation. They did,
however, succeed in protecting the one remaining Serbian enclave in
the brigade area, Gorazdevac. The Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese
soldiers in MNB West generally received high marks from the UN
and NGOs with whom they worked. Local Albanians criticized the
Italians for allowing Serbian paramilitaries to burn buildings in Pec,

21

but it is by no means clear that they had enough troops to stop them
without a major battle. NGO, IO, and UN agency members also
complained that Italian ofﬁcers lacked ﬂuency in English. They gave
the Portuguese, and particularly the Spaniards higher marks in this
regard. Nonetheless, the brigade performed yeoman service during
its ﬁrst year, protecting minority communities, escorting convoys,
providing humanitarian aid, and aiding in the rebuilding effort.
As in all areas of Kosovo, the most challenging task has been to
facilitate minority returns. Most went to the village of Gorazdevac.
Some returnees had lived in the village before the war, while
refugees came from other parts of Kosovo. Understandably, Serbians
had little interest in returning to communities from which they had
ﬂed. KFOR units had to escort returnees and protect the enclave.
Even this activity created problems with the majority community.
Albanians living in villages beyond Gorazdevac had to pass through
the Serbian enclave to reach Pec. They complained that the new
security arrangements cut them off from the regional center. Serbians
in the enclave had problems of their own; they required military
escort if they wished to shop in PEC. Setting up shopping excursions
resulted in a major tactical error on the part of MNB West. The
brigade organized one such excursion without coordinating their
activities with UNHCR or local NGOs. As a result, local merchants
and inhabitants were unprepared for the visit and responded with
hostility toward the Serbians.
These problems notwithstanding, the Italians and their
allies generally enjoyed good relations with the Albanian and
Serbian communities, UNMIK, and the numerous humanitarian
organizations in the brigade area. Ironically, the very intensity of
ethnic violence contributed to the relative calm that followed. After
the ethnic cleansing, destruction of Albanian property in the wake of
the Serbian withdrawal, and the KLA reprisals, few Serbians wanted
to return to their former homes. Thus while the humanitarian crisis
challenged the brigade, the threat of renewed ethnic violence did
not, by and large, complicate matters.
The relative calm of MNB West no doubt ﬁgured into the decision
to merge the operational area with MNB South in November 2002 to
create the new MNB Southwest, headquartered in Prizren and lead
by the Germans. The Italians, in turn, moved to Pristina to assume
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their role as lead nation in the new Multinational Specialized Unit
(MNSU). MNSU functions as a military police unit, working closely
with UNMIK civilian police to combat organized crime throughout
the province of Kosovo.33
MNB Center, The British.
MNB center is geographically the smallest, but demographically
the largest, brigade area in Kosovo, encompassing the capital city
of Pristina and the historic site of Lazar’s defeat, Kosovo Polje. The
brigade area also contains KFOR and UNMIK Headquarters, as well
as the main ofﬁces of numerous humanitarian organizations. The
capital has also become a center of organized crime as well as the
site of intense political activity. While Serbians ﬂed Pristina and its
environs, a signiﬁcant population remains in the city and in outlying
villages, usually surrounded by hostile Albanians.
The MNB Center contingent numbered 9,380 at the height
of KFOR troop strength in October 1999.34 Built around a British
brigade, the contingent has included units from Finland, Norway,
Sweden, Hungary, Ireland, Russia, the Czech Republic, and Canada,
under over-all British command. Led by the British, the brigade has
worked to provide a safe and secure environment, stem the exodus
of Serbians, facilitate refugee returns, rebuild critical infrastructure,
and cooperate with UNMIK to further the goal of a multiethnic,
democratic Kosovo.35
The British army entered Kosovo with more experience
of civil conﬂict than any other NATO country. To 30 years of
counterinsurgency operations in Ireland could be added a century
of imperial policing throughout a global empire. While none of
its campaigns exactly foreshadowed contemporary peace support
operations, collectively they provide a vast body of practical
knowledge upon which to draw.36 The British base their approach
to internal security on the common law principle, “aide to the civil
power.” Under this legal construct, soldiers lend their skills and
good ofﬁces to civil authorities confronted with unrest ranging from
riot to insurrection. The civilians never abdicate responsibility, and
the soldiers are bound by the same laws governing the behavior of

23

any other members of society, especially the principle of “minimum
force.” British soldiers in Northern Ireland, for example, can be
charged in a civilian court for any actions taken in performance of
their duties. If they kill or injure anyone, they must demonstrate that
their use of force was justiﬁed and limited.37
Limitation of the use of force and legal accountability for using it
forced the British army to take a more comprehensive, less military
approach to quelling disturbances. Both soldiers and civilians
worked to identify and address legitimate grievances upon which
unrest fed. Known as “winning hearts and minds,” this approach
often turned a hostile, or at best sullen, population into a cooperative
one. Cooperation in turn produced intelligence on the actions and
whereabouts of insurgents, which in turn led to the focused and
effective use of force against them. Grievances ranged from bread
and butter issues like running water, health care, and education to
independence. Tangible improvements in quality of life, however,
always proved easier to grant than political concessions.38 Kosovo
is not, of course, Northern Ireland. Neither imperial policing nor
counterinsurgency provides a precise formula for peace operations.
However, the British army’s long experience with civil conﬂict has
profoundly shaped its response to all unconventional military tasks.
MNB Center CIMIC operations clearly reﬂect the inﬂuence of the
British Army’s experience in “operations other than war.”
British KFOR has the smallest speciﬁcally dedicated CIMIC unit
of any lead nation in Kosovo. Only 12 people comprised the CivilMilitary Operations (CMO) group at British brigade headquarters
in Pristina. Such a small commitment of personnel would reﬂect
a profound disinterest in CIMIC were it not for the brigade
commanders proclamation that “CIMIC is every Soldier’s job.” This
simple statement sets the British apart from other lead nations. The
American commander behaves as though CA is not his primary
responsibility; the French commander openly declares that he cannot
perform his duties without the CIMIC unit; but the British commander
understands that CIMIC is his job. The distinction in outlook could
not be more profound, and it reﬂects the much older “aide to the
civil power” model. This understanding is reﬂected in the simple but
vital decision to co-locate UNMIK police headquarters at brigade
headquarters.
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The brigade’s conceptual approach to its task also reﬂects this
comprehensive understanding of the mission. The CMO group
delineates its tasks in three operational categories: support of military
operations (primarily facilitating return of refugees), support of
UNMIK (political development and critical infrastructure), and
“hearts and minds” (schools, clinics, community centers, etc.) Next
to “hearts in minds” in the “CMO Operational Lines” ﬂow chart,
appear the words, “force protection.”39
This linkage, so natural to the British approach, so foreign to
the American, deserves some comment. The U.S. military generally
understands force protection in fairly literal terms: construction of
secure bases, robust rules of engagement, protective equipment,
restrictions on individual movement, etc.40 While not neglecting
these physical precautions, the British army understands security
in broader terms. Good relations with the local community, which
often produces sound intelligence, are just as important to protecting
soldiers as ﬂak jackets and barbed wire. The British also understand
that an over-reliance on traditional force protection creates a barrier
between peacekeepers and the local population.
This more nuanced approach to force protection also affects the
conduct of operations. Unencumbered by “battle rattle” and the need
to move armed to the teeth in groups of four, British soldiers have
a much easier time interacting with local people. I once observed
an American colonel visit a Kosovo Protection Corps headquarters
surrounded by a squad of heavily armed soldiers. Nothing in the
situation warranted such extreme precautions. I also accompanied
a British Colonel into a Serbian apartment building surrounded by
hostile Albanian neighbors in downtown Pristina. Assisted by a
single interpreter, he entered the building in shirtsleeves, wearing
a beret, and carrying only a sidearm. This relaxed approach soon
revealed his real source of security. An elderly Serbian woman
(obviously a leader in her community) gave the colonel a hug and
kisses on both cheeks and invited him up to her apartment for coffee.
Her friendship provided far more protection than a ﬂak jacket.
This episode also reveals another truth about peace operations:
the importance of receiving hospitality. The United States has
what has been described as a “low-context” culture. Impatient of
results and persuaded that “time is money,” Americans in their
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business and even in their social dealings want to “get to the point,”
“cut to the chase,” “talk turkey.” They have little patience for
the relationship building that most cultures require before doing
business. The British colonel chatted with the Serbian women over
various mundane things for most of the meeting before getting to
the reason for his visit. Accepting a cup of coffee or a cigarette from
some one who has nothing else to offer is vital for building the good
relations upon which CIMIC depends.
Despite this highly effective approach, MNB Center’s CIMIC
record is not perfect. Early efforts to construct a market for Serbians
and Albanians failed. Ironically, members from the two communities
will engage in business out of their car trunks at night, when no one
can see them interacting with the “enemy.” There have also been
complaints of the brigade setting up their own refugee returns
without involving the humanitarian community. Finally, the British
army’s comprehensive approach feels very much like co-option to
some NGOs. These criticisms notwithstanding, the MNB Center
approach to CIMIC and its results remain impressive.
UNHCR representatives and NGO personnel generally found
the British to be more effective at CIMIC than other national
contingents. They launched foot patrols in Pristina as soon as they
arrived, preventing much of the destruction that occurred in other
brigade areas. In the villages, they billeted soldiers with Serbians
frightened of Albanian retaliation. They manned check points with
an easy going, nonconfrontational style that defused tension. Several
NGO/IO observers described them as “in a class by themselves”
among the NATO peacekeepers.
BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED
The Kosovo intervention yields valuable lessons that can inform
the conduct of future missions. For purpose of discussion, these
lessons may be divided into strategic, operational, and tactical;
however, this distinction blurs in the ﬁeld. No past mission can
provide a precise blueprint for any future one. Broad principles
and general guidelines useful in planning and conducting peace
operations can, however, be derived from careful study of pervious
interventions. These lessons are particularly relevant for the U.S.
Army.
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Strategic Planning.
NATO had relatively little time to cobble together a multinational
operations plan amid an escalating bombing campaign and a
worsening refugee crisis. The plan envisioned three scenarios: a
ﬁghting entry into Kosovo, a peaceful handover from the retreating
Yugoslav Army, and a hybrid situation somewhere between the two
extremes. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
drew up the CIMIC plan as part of the overall mission design.
On paper at least, the SHAPE CIMIC plan was comprehensive
and ﬂexible. It assumed that KFOR would provide “life saving”
support in the ﬁrst phase of the mission; that the international
community would appoint a lead agency; and that only Britain
and the United States would have CIMIC up and running from
the start.41 The plan outlined three broad CIMIC aims: “Provide
CIMIC support to the force; provide temporary civil administration;
maximize IO/NGO capabilities to assist Kosovars to establish a selfsustaining civil administration.”42 Speciﬁc tasks included the whole
range of activities from rebuilding infrastructure to refugee return
and democratization. The SHAPE plan envisioned interconnected
CIMIC Centers at local, brigade, and province level.
Impressive as the plan looked on paper, it had several weaknesses
that should be addressed in future missions. Of necessity, CIMIC
units had to be created within each brigade area based on the
capabilities and resources of troop contributing states. This approach
meant that the quality of CIMIC operations would vary widely.
Worse still, the absence of a full CIMIC headquarters unit inhibited
coordination and consistency. As a result, national interests, such
as the German desire to resettle Kosovar refugees from Germany,
took precedence over strategic considerations. Furthermore, the lead
agency, UNHCR, was not closely involved in planning, while most
other humanitarian organizations were left out entirely.
Recommendation. Liaison between key international organizations
(UNHCR, ICRC, major NGOs, etc.) needs to be strengthened at the
planning stage. This requires developing permanent mechanisms
for exchange of information and coordination of activities. While
some improvements have been made, more needs to be done. One
NATO ofﬁcer has been designated to liaise with UNHCR and other
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organizations, but given the resources of the alliance and the scope
of complex emergencies, more assets could be devoted to this work.
Troop-contributing nations should also seek out and institutionalize
opportunities for information exchange, coordination, and planning
before a mission occurs. Given its emphasis on task specialization
and the consequent tendency of experience to become compartmentalized, the U.S. military in particular should create more
opportunities for on-going cooperation.
Civil-Military Cooperation or Cooption?
The biggest challenge in bridging the gap between humanitarian
and military actors in complex emergencies consists in reconciling
differing perceptions of the mission and each other’s role within it.
Virtually every humanitarian organization harbors at least some
unease about CIMIC, and more than a few remain outright hostile
towards it. They see the entire concept as an effort to subordinate
their activities to the military mission. NATO’s frank admission
that CIMIC is a “force multiplier” contributes to this unease. The
soldiers have learned that dispensing humanitarian aid can improve
their image with the population and make their other duties more
palatable. An understandable human desire to help those in need
further encourages this tendency.
The humanitarian community raises certain valid objections to
soldiers doing relief work on their own. First, militaries generally
lack experience with, and in some cases even an understanding of,
the complexity of delivering aid. They may rush to meet a need
in one location without considering whether the same quality
of assistance can be delivered elsewhere and what such uneven
delivery of services does to community relations. Because they
see humanitarian aid as a tool to be used in furthering the military
objective, soldiers may also wish to withhold relief supplies as
punishment for some infraction or hostile act. Such an approach
is antithetical to the mission of all humanitarian organizations and
cannot be tolerated. In addition, military personnel tend to treat
most problems as logistical. Asked to facilitate minority returns to
Kosovo, they would determine the number of returnees, factor in the
time frame for the operation, and then calculate the transportation
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and escort needs to bring people back, ignoring the enormous social,
economic, and psychological complexities of return. Finally, relief
agencies feel that in delivering humanitarian aid, soldiers create
an intolerable ambiguity in the minds of recipients. Is the soldier
here to enforce the rules, if necessary at the point of a gun, or does
he/she come to deliver food and clothing? Is the man or woman
delivering supplies really from a relief agency, or is he/she a soldier
in disguise?43
If they had their druthers, most relief organizations would
insist on as a clear a separation of military and humanitarian tasks
as possible. They would prefer that soldiers stick to maintaining
security and freedom of movement. Under certain circumstances,
they would welcome the military lending its enormous resources
as an “aid multiplier.” A UNHCR protection ofﬁcer frankly
admitted that NATO forces in Macedonia saved thousands of lives
by constructing, virtually overnight, refugee camps with adequate
shelter and sanitation―a task beyond the capacity of any IO or NGO
at the time.
Recommendation. Most soldiers and relief workers understand
that they need one another. They have overlapping but not identical
missions. The effectiveness of the overlap can, however, be increased
and its value to both missions enhanced. CIMIC can function as both
a “force multiplier” and an “aid multiplier.” The goal should be
synergy, making the mission, as a whole, more effective than any
of its component parts. For both morale and community-relations
purposes, soldiers need to be seen engaging in hands-on relief
projects. They should, however, do so under the direction of the
lead relief organization, usually UNHCR, or the NGO council/
coordinating body.44 Such coordination would hardly compromise
the military mission but could maximize use of resources and ensure
equitable distribution of aid. The military would need to relinquish
strategic command of the relief project, and relief organizations
would have to share some of their turf. Both, however, could
beneﬁt enormously from such cooperation. The military can lend its
enormous logistical and engineering assets to an emergency relief
effort, but it should do so with the cooperation and guidance of IOs
with more humanitarian experience and a better understanding of
exactly what is needed when and where.
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Once again, planning and prepositioning of assets is crucial.
The greatest coordination problems in Kosovo occurred during the
ﬁrst 6 months of the mission when the situation was most chaotic.
Valuable time and energy were wasted in developing coordination
on the ground, which should have been done prior to entering the
province.
Bridging the Cultural Gap.
Improved cooperation depends on better understanding of and
respect for one another’s institutions. The vertical organizational
structure of the military does not mesh well with the horizontal
organizational structure of humanitarian organizations. Aid workers
generally enjoy much greater latitude in the conduct of their duties
than do their military counterparts. Soldiers prefer a clear objective
and like to take decisive action to achieve it. Relief workers take a
more nuanced approach to what they see as complex problems,
preferring to go slowly.
While Kosovo and Bosnia have done much to build mutual
respect, considerable misunderstanding still exists. Soldiers even
accused UNHCR workers of being naïve about the dangers of
a war zone. NGO/IO personnel, many of whom have worked
in more dangerous environments than most soldiers, resented
such paternalism. For their part, soldiers found the profoundly
antimilitary attitudes of some relief workers offensive. Both partners
were quite capable of jealously guarding their turf.
Information Sharing
Accurate information on the local situation is vital to the success
of both humanitarian and military missions. Such information should
be exchanged as freely as possible. However, many IOs/NGOs
complain that security brieﬁngs often provide them with little useful
information, and that when they request more detail, the military
responds with, “That information is classiﬁed.” Any military unit
must at times withhold information for security reasons. However,
soldiers almost automatically fall back on the “classiﬁed” rule,
even when the information requested will not compromise security
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or sources. Soldiers should also understand that, although IOs/
NGOs desire to assist them, they cannot always reveal conﬁdential
information. This limitation is especially true for the International
Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, for whom the guarantee
of conﬁdentiality gains them access to prisons and detention centers
around the world.
Recommendation. Regular and sustained interaction may be the
only antidote for prejudice and misunderstanding. While some steps
have been taken to improve cooperation through education, they
remain limited and ad hoc. A very small percentage, particularly in
the larger militaries, of soldiers likely to deploy on a peace operation
will have had prolonged contact with humanitarian organizations.
Given their size and speciﬁc humanitarian focus, most relief workers
will have had at least some prolonged contact with at least one
military unit in the ﬁeld, although this experience will probably
have been mixed.
Building a study unit on CIMIC into the Command and Staff
College courses taken by captains and majors in virtually all armies
could accomplish a great deal without placing inordinate demands
on training time or resources. These units would be most effective
if taught in part by NGO/IO personnel, who would at the same
time gain ﬁrst hand knowledge of military operations, culture, etc.
Personnel exchanges in which members of these organizations and
military ofﬁcers attended each other’s training course could further
enhance communication and cooperation.
Security, Law, and Order.
Despite SHAPE’s three-option plan, KFOR entered Kosovo
prepared for only two scenarios, neither of which occurred: a
ﬁghting entry to expel the Yugoslav army and paramilitaries, and
a peaceful hand over of the province. Instead a power vacuum
opened between the retreating army and the occupying force.
Fleeing Serbian paramilitaries burned and looted Albanian homes
before KFOR troops arrived or, in some cases, as they stood by and
watched. A few months later, returning Albanians attacked Serbian
and Roma property in retaliation. In some sectors soldiers again
looked on and, in one case, remarked that retribution was inevitable.
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The British managed to reduce such destruction in their brigade area
by mounting foot patrols similar to those used in Northern Ireland
from the outset of the their mission in Kosovo.
Recommendation. The mandate for any humanitarian intervention
in a failed state should include police powers and require the
intervening force to oppose lawlessness as well as maintain military
security. Such powers should be of limited duration, lasting only
until UN, civilian, and/or local police can assume responsibility for
ordinary law enforcement. Following the British practice in Pristina,
UN CIVPOL headquarters should be collocated with brigade
headquarters or have some suitable mechanism to coordinate
activities created.
Length of Deployment.
Few aspects of civil-military cooperation bother humanitarian
organizations more than the short-term nature of military
deployments. U.S. forces in Kosovo operate on a 6-month rotation;
the French deploy for only 4 months. Most NGOs deploy personnel
for at least a year, UNHCR for as many as 2 years in hazardous duty
stations (with leave). The high turnover rate of military personnel
causes no end of difﬁculty for their humanitarian counterparts.
No sooner did a CIMIC ofﬁcer become effective in his position
than he left Kosovo and a replacement had to be familiarized with
humanitarian work in the brigade area. Civil-military relations could
go from good to poor in an instant because of personnel change.
NGO/IO personnel tired of repeating the same brieﬁngs, answering
the same questions, and rebuilding the same trust every couple of
months.
The United States has improved the situation by overlapping
the Civil Affairs battalion rotations by 1 week. The serving unit thus
has a chance to share experience with its replacement. However, the
CA ofﬁcers consider this hand-off period too short to guarantee a
smooth transition. Most of the other NATO units had no transition
period at all.
Recommendation. Although NATO and its partners should be
able to standardize troop rotations to 6 months, they will probably
not agree to longer deployments. Member states point out that a
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6-month deployment effectively removes a unit from other duties
for an entire year: 3 months to train for the mission, 6 months in the
ﬁeld, and 3 months for leaves and retraining for other missions. The
6-month deployment could be made more effective by increasing
the overlap period, at least for the CIMIC/CA battalion commander
and his staff. Year-long deployments for key personnel might
be made feasible by a more enlightened leave policy. With the
number of military ﬂights in and out of Kosovo and with most troop
contributors 8 hours ﬂying time or less away, monthly leaves should
not be that difﬁcult.
Implications for the U.S. Military.
The previous recommendations apply universally to all military
units deploying for a humanitarian intervention. Because of its
size and nature, the U.S. military faces additional challenges in
conducting peace support operations.
1. Over-emphasis on Force Protection: The United States emphasizes
force protection more than any other unit in Kosovo. As one senior
member of an international organization observed at the start of the
KFOR mission, the American military behaved “as though force
protection was the mission” instead of a means of achieving it.
Driven by domestic political considerations, which deem the loss of
even one soldier in a peace operation unacceptable, force protection
rules bear no meaningful relationship to the security environment in
which soldiers operate.
Robust rules of engagement, over-emphasis on force protection,
and the impatience of American culture have made U.S. soldiers
more confrontational than they need to be for most peacekeeping
situations. Relief workers and other civilians have repeatedly
complained of GIs being brusque, rude, and, in many cases, outright
abusive at checkpoints. One senior IO ofﬁcial noted astutely that
even the way Americans carry their weapons intimidates people
unnecessarily. While the British cradle their Armalites in a disarming
manner that leaves them no less ready to respond, Americans carry
riﬂes in the engarde position, treating every one they encounter as a
potential threat.
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In a peace operation this intimidating posture hinders
development of good civil-military relations. People prefer to
be trusted rather than threatened. Without putting the lives of
American soldiers at risk, it might be possible to reassess the nature
of force protection. Good community relations, which can lead to
accurate information about the situation on the ground, may do
more to keep soldiers safe than barbed wire, hardtop humvees, and
heavy weapons.
2. Better Integration of CIMIC/CA with the Military Missions. The sheer
size and complexity of the American armed forces presents further
challenges to effective civil-military cooperation. Specialization,
which may provide certain advantages in conventional war,
becomes a disadvantage in peace operations. NGO/IO personnel
note that the American Civil Affairs battalion seems detached from
Task Force Falcon of which it is a part. As a result, CA ofﬁcers
cannot call upon the enormous resources at the disposal of the force
commander. The Austrian CIMIC ofﬁcer had only to stroll across
the compound to get the well cleaning equipment he needed, but
his American counterpart would have had to go through layers of
bureaucracy even to request the use of such equipment. He would
then probably have been told that the equipment could be used only
for its strictly designated purpose: supporting the military mission.
At the very least, the delay in getting a response discourages most
aid workers from even asking for help.
Subcontracting of services to companies such as Kellogg Brown
& Root further restricts the force commander and his CIMIC ofﬁcers
from employing equipment that could be used to aid in the relief and
recovery mission.45 They could not participate in the kind of joint
project done in the French brigade area. After the Belgian Red Cross
built a school in a village, French engineers used their equipment to
construct a playground in front of the school. The project respected
the IO’s role, employed assets the Red Cross did not have and which
otherwise sat idle, and improved relations between the community
and the brigade. Everyone beneﬁted.
3. Decentralization of Command and Control. The American military
in peace operations tends to be rigidly hierarchical. Junior ofﬁcers
are allowed relatively little latitude in carrying out orders and few
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opportunities for taking initiative. Routine requests for even minimal
assistance often require asking up the chain of command with the
inevitable delays and frequent denials. Since much cooperation
occurs locally, junior ofﬁcers should be permitted greater freedom
of action within broad mission guidelines.
4. Lack of Cultural Education. American soldiers, like their civilian
counterparts, belong to a low-context, can-do, take-charge, get-tothe point culture. We have little patience for relationship building,
and our superpower status generally insulates us from having to
negotiate on anyone else’s terms. We trail most developed nations
in the study of foreign languages. As a result, we do not travel well.
While the military can hardly be expected to change engrained social
habits, it can do a better job of educating soldiers about the history,
culture, society, and politics of the lands it must enter. Foreign Area
Ofﬁcers (FAOs) represent a valuable and underutilized resource that
can help to remedy this situation. Universities and think tanks across
the country contain regional specialists, who could be employed
on a temporary basis to prepare training materials and provide
predeployment brieﬁngs. The strengthening of the FAO Program
can further enhance CIMIC operations.
Conclusion: Iraq and Beyond.
Mounting casualties and spiraling costs in Iraq make the issues of
civil-military cooperation timelier than ever. The best way to avoid
getting bogged down in a costly and protracted nation-building
operation is to do CIMIC well from the outset. Effective cooperation
maximizes use of military and humanitarian assets, increases
the security of the troops, and facilitates a more rapid transfer
of responsibility to civilian authorities. Education and training
are essential to producing unity of effort in the ﬁeld. Personnel
exchanges, joint courses, and combined planning can occur without
compromising the integrity of either the military or humanitarian
missions. Cooperation and liaison on a regular basis can maximize
the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention while maintaining
the essential distinction between military and civilian roles.
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